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Abstract 
The present study examines the extent to which stronger belief in either extrasensory 
perception, psychokinesis or life-after-death is associated with a proneness to making 
conjunction errors (CEs). One hundred and sixty members of the UK public read eight 
hypothetical scenarios and for each estimated the likelihood that two constituent events 
alone plus their conjunction would occur. The impact of paranormal belief plus 
constituents’ conditional relatedness type, estimates of the subjectively less likely and 
more likely constituents plus relevant interaction terms tested via three Generalized Linear 
Mixed Models. General qualification levels were controlled for. As expected, stronger PK 
beliefs and depiction of a positively conditionally related (verses conditionally unrelated) 
constituent pairs predicted higher CE generation. ESP and LAD beliefs had no impact 
with, surprisingly, higher estimates of the less likely constituent predicting fewer - not 
more - CEs. Theoretical implications, methodological issues and ideas for future research 
are discussed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: PARANORMAL BELIEF; CONJUNCTION FALLACY; CONDITIONAL 
RELATED; SURPRISE; PROBABILISTIC REASONING 
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1. Introduction 
The veracity of reported paranormal experiences remains a hotly debated topic (e.g., 
Krippner & Friedman, 2010) which, if ever verified, would have profound implications for 
the so-called “hard problem” of consciousness research; how physical brain processes give 
rise to subjective experiences. Extrasensory perception (ESP; defined as the alleged ability to 
obtain information without recourse to the known senses or through logical inference), 
psychokinesis (PK; the alleged ability to influence physical systems directly through mental 
processes) and life after death (LAD: the notion that some disembodied aspect of human 
personality or consciousness survives bodily death, at least for a time) all challenge pre-
existing doctrines in which mental states are either dismissed (materialism) else seen to be a 
mere by-product of neurological processes (epiphenomenalism). If consciousness can survive 
bodily death then, by definition, a physical brain is not required for subjective mental states 
to be experienced. Regardless of their veracity ostensibly paranormal experiences tend to 
have significant impact on a person’s worldview and self-concept (Cardeña, Lynn, & 
Krippner, 2014). 
Skeptics - and in particular anomalistic psychologists - try to understand paranormal 
beliefs and experiences by recourse to known physical and/or psychological processes. 
Factors known to underlie at least some types of paranormal endorsement are both varied and 
complex (French & Stone, 2014; Irwin, 2009), and presently include demographic 
background (e.g., gender, ethnicity); facets of personality (e.g., openness to experiences, 
fantasy proneness) and individual differences (e.g., scientific education, religiosity); 
psychobiological composition (e.g., temporal lobe liability, hemispheric dominance); socio-
cultural influence (e.g., from peers, the media); developmental variation (e.g., childhood 
trauma, propensity for magical thinking); innate evolutionary processes (e.g., 
anthropomorphism, agency misperceptions); and finally, both clinical and sub-clinical 
Running Head: PARANORMAL BELIEF & CAUSAL CONJUNCTION ERRORS 
3 
psychopathology (e.g., neuroticism, schizotypy, dissociativity, psychosis). To date, there is 
much evidence to suggest believers are prone to a variety of cognitive “deficits” (Irwin, 
2009), arguably the most robust of which relates to errors of probabilistic reasoning (for a 
review see Rogers, 2015).  
Whilst most people are poor intuitive statisticians (Diaconis & Mosteller, 1989) this seems 
especially true of paranormal believers (for a review see Rogers, 2014). For example, it is 
often claimed paranormal believers “look beyond chance” to causally explain what are 
essentially chance outcomes (misattribution hypothesis; Wiseman & Watt, 2006). According 
to Bressan (2002) paranormal believers possess a comparatively lax internal representation of 
what constitutes randomness and as such, usually require less objective evidence of 
relatedness before they will misperceive a subjectively meaningful - hence causal - 
relationship onto otherwise unrelated events; a process Shermer (2011) has termed 
“patternicity”. Believers’ proneness to patternicity is associated with either left visual field/ 
right hemisphere dominance (e.g., Pizzagalli, Lehmann & Brugger, 2001) else right 
hemisphere overactivation (e.g., Brugger, Regard, Landis, Cook, Krebs, & Niederberger, 
1993) and, in turn, appears unduly influenced by extraneous factors such as the 
“observability” of potential causes (Bressan, 2002; although see Rogers, Qualter & Wood, 
2016). As Rogers (2015) asserts, it seems paranormal believers’ LVF/RH dominance and/or 
RH overactivation leads them to misperceive random events as being (causally) connected in 
some a meaningful way. 
Such misattributions of randomness seem relevant to believers’ susceptibility to a more 
specific bias the so-called conjunction fallacy; the tendency to misjudge independent yet co-
occurring (conjunctive) events as being more likely than either constituent event alone 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1982; 1983; see also Fisk, 2017). When thinking about a long-lost 
friend (constituent 1) is quickly followed, for no observable reason, by the same friend 
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unexpectedly telephoning (constituent 2), many people will judge the co-occurrence of these 
two events (thinking about the friend and then the friend telephoning) more likely than either 
singular constituent event alone (cf. Rhine-Feather & Schmicker, 2005). Such conjunctions 
are reminiscent of reported paranormal experiences such as extrasensory perceptions and thus 
should be more pronounced in those with stronger paranormal beliefs. 
1.1 Paranormal Belief and the Conjunction Fallacy 
A number of studies suggest adult paranormal belief is associated with more conjunctive 
errors (CEs) regardless of whether events are depicted within an ostensibly paranormal or 
clearly non-paranormal context, the implication being that believers are especially prone to a 
context-neutral or generic conjunction fallacy (Brotherton & French, 2014; Dagnall, 
Drinkwater, Denovan, Parker & Rowley, 2016; Prike, Arnold & Williamson, 2017; Rogers, 
Davis & Fisk, 2009; Rogers, Fisk & Lowrie, 2016; Rogers, Fisk & Wiltshire, 2011). Other 
work has found no such relationship (Dagnall, Denovan, Drinkwater, Parker, & Clough, 
2016; Dagnall, Drinkwater, Parker & Rowley, 2014; Dagnall, Parker & Munley, 2007) with 
Dagnall et al. (2014) claiming believers’ are susceptible only to misperceiving randomness1.  
In the aforementioned study, Rogers et al. (2011) explored believers’ fallacy proneness 
further by testing belief-based differences in likelihood estimates relating to each constituent 
                                                 
1 It should be noted that a number of studies have examined confirmatory and other the reasoning biases 
inherent in paranormal scepticism. Koehler (1993), for instance, found scientists and other professional sceptics 
judged the relevance, methodological rigour and presentational quality of research to be higher in studies where 
results were consistent with (confirmed) their prior belief concerning the veracity of extrasensory perception 
(ESP), with few recognising their assessment of study quality was influenced by study outcome. Roe (1999) 
reports similar belief-congruency biases amongst undergraduates classified as believers or disbelievers 
according to their score on a popular paranormal belief scale (one standard deviation above verses below the 
mean respectively). More recently, Irwin (2015) employed a task - the viewing of seemingly genuine 
photographic evidence of self-levitation - specifically designed to evoke a novel paranormal belief/disbelief in 
real time and found the intensity of newly evoked disbeliefs correlated with a preference for rational-analytic 
thinking whereas newly evoked beliefs, by comparison, did not. According to Irwin, disbelievers were more 
inclined to adopt analytic-rational thinking style “as a matter of habit” (p. 137) and the implication being that 
traditional paranormal belief measures might obscure certain cognitive processes associated only with 
paranormal scepticism. However, in follow-up work Irwin, Dagnall and Drinkwater (2017) found correlations 
between paranormal belief and cognitive measures such as thinking style, aberrant salience and emotion-based 
reasoning were, in absolute terms, just as strong for believers as they were for skeptics leading these authors to 
conclude paranormal belief and skepticism do lie on the same unidimensional continuum.  
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event. Contrary to expectations, paranormal believers deemed the two singular constituents 
just as likely as did paranormal skeptics. Based on the tacit assumption that constituent and 
conjunctive events are linearly related, Rogers et al. (2011) also explored belief-based 
differences in the perceived strength of constituent-conjunction relationships. Such a 
relationship is indicated by the homogeneity of regression slope between estimates of (a) the 
subjectively less likely (LL) constituent2 and (b) the conjunctive term. No such differences 
emerged, with the perceived strength of constituent-conjunction relationships unaffected by 
paranormal belief status. 
Despite these negative findings, other research - outside the realm of adult paranormality - 
suggests that the perceived conditional relatedness of constituent pairs will sometimes impact 
on CE generation. It is to this literature that discussion now turns. 
1.2 The Conditional Relatedness of Constituent Events 
According to Tversky and Kahneman (1983) the conjunction fallacy usually reflects 
implicit knowledge of category norms. In such cases, “representative conjunction errors” 
arise whenever two events (A and B) differ in the extent to which they resemble some 
internalized model (M) of a target person/event. Representative CEs within this M A 
paradigm are common and mostly generated by likely/unlikely (L/U) constituent pairs. In 
such cases, the more representative (likely) constituent is believed to be far more influential 
in shaping conjunctive probability estimates. Tversky and Kahneman’s (1982; 1983) now 
classic “Linda problem” is often cited as a good illustration of this model3.  
                                                 
2 The subjectively less likely (LL) constituent event is itself defined by one of two ways. Assuming estimates of 
the first constituent exceed those of the second [p(A) > p(B)] then, for conditionally unrelated constituents LL 
reflects whichever of the two singular constituents is assigned the lower probability value, in this case p(B). 
However, when constituents are conditionally positively related, LL may sometimes be based on the conditional 
event p(B|A)- [i.e. the second constituent given prior occurrence of the first]. Since estimates for the conditional 
event will, by definition, be higher than those of the singular constituent [p(B|A) > p(B)] such as situation is 
more likely to give rise to CEs (cf. Fisk, 2002; Fisk & Pidgeon, 1998).  
3 Here, the fictitious Linda is described as being 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright, who majored 
in philosophy and who, as a student, had been deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice 
and who had participated in antinuclear demonstrations with participants asked to rank the likelihood of eight 
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In their alternative A B paradigm Tversky and Kahneman (1983) claimed conjunction 
errors can also be generated whenever occurrence of the second constituent is viewed as 
being conditionally dependent upon occurrence of the first. In other words, because the 
second component offers a plausible explanation for the occurrence of the first, the second 
component makes the conjunction appear more likely than the just first component alone. To 
illustrate, a sudden drop in public consumption of oil will seem less likely than a sudden drop 
in oil consumption given a sharp rise in oil prices because in the latter conditional event, the 
second element (the rise in price) offers a plausible explanation for the first (the fall in 
consumption). These "causal conjunction errors" are common even for unlikely/unlikely 
(U/U) constituent combinations and presumably reflect peoples’ tendency to seek plausible, 
non-chance explanations for co-occurring events. Locksley and Stangor (1984) make a 
similar point arguing that the presence of certain cues (e.g. the temporal proximity or 
perceived rarity of constituent events) shift attention away from normative statistics laws on 
to the search for causal explanations. Furthermore, comparatively rare events such as suicide 
tend to require several co-occurring factors (e.g., job loss, severe debt, family break-up and a 
loss of social support) before any explanation seems reasonable. In other words, it is the 
logical plausibility of what might cause a seemingly rare event that determines subjective 
probability estimates and thus CE generation (Locksley & Stangor, 1984). This argument 
seems especially relevant to the misattribution biases associated with belief in the paranormal 
(cf. Wiseman & Watt, 2006).  
In sum, different psychological processes appear to underlie Tversky and Kahneman’s 
MA (representativeness) verses AB (causal) accounts of the conjunction fallacy, with 
                                                                                                                                                        
outcomes including that Linda is an active feminist (representative outcome), that Linda is a bank teller 
(unrepresentative outcome) and that Linda is a bank teller and an active feminist (conjunctive outcome; italics 
added here). In their original study Tversky and Kahneman (1982) found the majority of participants (85%) 
rated the conjunctive term more likely than the second constituent event (aka. the unrepresentative outcome) 
despite this being statistically impossible. 
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only the latter requiring a perceived conditional relationship between constituent events. 
Indeed, for Tversky and Kahneman (1983) it is the perceived strength - not mere presence - 
of constituents’ conditional relationship that shapes CE generation, with a stronger 
conditional relationship leading to a stronger conjunction fallacy 
Others dispute Tversky and Kahneman’s AB hypothesis. Yates and Carlson (1986) 
found no differences in CE rates for common verses rare constituents and claimed it is (a 
weighted average of) constituent probability estimates - not constituent relatedness - that 
shape conjunctive biases. Similarly, Thürling and Jungermann (1990) found the causal 
relationship between two hypothetical diseases A and B (i.e. whether or not disease B was 
possible a side effect of disease A) had no impact on either CE generation or estimates of the 
conjunctive terms probability. Base-rate likelihoods however did, with both CEs conjunctive 
estimates more pronounced when the probability of contracting one disease was high (around 
35%) and the other low (<1%). This suggests constituent causality alone is not sufficient to 
induce conjunction errors; a direct contradiction of the AB hypothesis. 
These early studies have since been criticized for failing to provide the appropriate context 
by which to judge causal conjunctions (Fabre, Caverni & Jungermann, 1995). In response, 
Fabre and colleagues employed a within subjects design with respondents estimating 
probabilities across all levels of constituent relatedness, namely strongly causal (e.g., disease 
B is a common side effect of disease A), weakly causal (e.g., disease B is a possible side 
effect of disease A) or acausal (e.g., disease B is not mentioned in relation to disease A) 
conditions. As expected, strength of constituent relatedness had significant impact, with 
conjunctive probability estimates higher for both (a) strongly over weakly causally related 
and (b) causally related over unrelated comparisons. In a second study, the same authors 
replicated these differences and confirmed probability estimates reflected likelihood 
judgments rather than idiosyncratic mental representations of each disease. Together, these 
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findings suggest causally related constituents are sufficient for CE generation providing 
observers are able to compare constituent relationships within an appropriate causal context 
(Fabre et al., 1995).  
With evidence for paranormal believers’ heightened susceptibility to both conjunctive 
errors (e.g., Rogers et al., 2009; 2011; 2016) and causal misattributions (Wiseman & Watt, 
2006), it seems reasonable to suggest they will be especially prone to making causal 
conjunction errors, even more so when constituent events appear to be strongly causally 
related (cf. Fabre et al., 1995; Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). This claim has yet to be tested. 
1.3 The Potential Surprisingness of Constituent Events 
Another account of the conjunction fallacy focuses on the “potential surprise value” (PSV) of 
constituent events. According to Shackle (1969) subjective probability estimates reflect the 
extent to which events are able to surprise observers. For example, a rank outsider winning 
the Wimbledon tennis final will be judged more surprising - that is, subjectively less likely 
(LL) - than the top seed winning it (Fisk, 2017).  
Crucially for Shackle, the PSV of the conjunctive term never exceeds that of the more 
surprising (less likely) constituent. Hence, when constituents are conditionally unrelated (so 
occurrence of one does not influence the perceived likelihood of the other), the PSV of the 
conjunctive term will be determined solely by the more surprising (less likely) constituent; 
that is by whichever of p(A) or p(B) is assigned the lower value. However, when constituents 
are perceived to be positively conditionally related (so occurrence of one makes the other 
seem more likely), the conjunctive PSV is determined by whichever of two outcomes - either 
(a) the second constituent alone or (b) the second constituent given prior occurrence of the 
first - is judged most surprisingly (less likely). In other words, conjunctive estimations for 
positively conditionally related events are determined by judgments of either the singular 
event [p(B]) or the conditional event [p(B\A)], whichever has the lower value (see also Fisk 
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2002; Fisk & Pidgeon, 1998). By logical extension, CEs involving positively conditionally 
related constituents arise when estimates of the conjunctive term exceed those of whichever 
constituent estimate [p(B) or p(B\A)] has the higher value4. At present, the reasons why this 
might occur are not well understood (Fisk, 2017). This reasoning does not apply when two 
events are negatively conditionally related (i.e. where occurrence of one event renders the 
other seemingly less probable). Here conjunctive probability estimates are based on the 
conditional term [p(B\A)] which, given the negative relationship between constituents, will 
be deemed less likely (more surprising) than either or both these two events. 
Shackle’s PSV account has been empirically supported. In the first of two studies, Fisk 
and Pidgeon (1998) found conjunction probability estimates were higher and CE generation 
more prominent when constituent pairs were conditionally related verses conditionally 
unrelated. However contrary to expectations, the strength of constituents’ relationship - 
calculated as difference between p(B|A) minus p(B) - was not linked to CE generation. 
Follow-up work replicated these findings and additionally, tested the extent to which 
estimates of the first singular constituent [p(A)] and conditional statement [p(B|A)] predicted 
estimates of the conjunctive term. Overall, beta coefficients for the conditional term were 
smaller when constituent pairs had a positive as opposed to either a negative or no 
conditional relationship supporting the view that CEs are determined by the potential surprise 
value of individual constituents. With parallel trends emerging for likely/likely (L/L), 
likely/unlikely (L/U), unlikely/likely (U/L) and unlikely/unlikely (U/U) constituent 
combinations, this effect appeared to be robust (Fisk & Pidgeon, 1998). 
                                                 
4 The assumption here is that respondents judge constituent B more surprisingly (subjectively less likely) than 
constituent A. Of course it is also possible some participants will do the opposite deem constituent A more 
surprisingly (less likely) than constituent B. In such cases, the conjunctive PSV is determined by whichever of 
p(A) or p(B\A) is assigned the lower estimation value. For simplicity, future discussion will assume respondents 
base their estimations on B rather than A. Note that a more extreme situation can arise when estimates of the 
conditional event [p(B\A)] exceed estimates of both singular events [p(A) as well as p(B)]. In such instances, it 
is possible some respondents will base their conjunctive estimates more on p(A) and less on p(B) rendering 
these conjunctive estimations even more fallacious. 
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Fisk and Pidgeon (1998) also argue that the absolute magnitude of estimates for the more 
surprising (less likely) event will, under most conditions, play little if any role in fallacy 
generation. All other things being equal, the mere presence of conditionally related 
constituents should be sufficient for CEs to arise. Contrary to this assertion, Crisp and Feeney 
(2009) found the strength of constituents’ causal relationship did have a significant impact on 
CE rates, with most errors generated for strongly causal, then weakly causal and fewest for 
acausal, constituent pairings. Crisp and Feeney speculated this might reflect observers finding 
it harder to generate plausible counter-examples to conjunctive outcomes. 
To recap, several studies support Tversky and Kahneman’s (1983) claim that conjunction 
errors arise whenever constituent events are (perceived to be) conditionally related, with 
some researchers claiming strongly related constituents lead to a bigger fallacy. Evidence for 
this A B paradigm is however mixed. An alternative view forwarded by Fisk emphasizes 
the potential surprise value (PSV) of each constituent, at least when these are positive and 
conditionally related. These differing accounts of the conjunction fallacy, together with 
Tversky and Kahneman’s (1983) original MA paradigm, are summarized in Table 1.  
*** Table 1 here *** 
Researchers have yet to examine paranormal believers’ susceptibility to making causal 
over acausal conjunction errors directly. As previously discussed, Rogers et al. (2011) found 
believers’ proclivity for generating CE’s was not caused by them either (a) judging one or 
both constituents more likely or (b) perceiving the subjectively less likely component as 
having a stronger functional association with conjunctive term. However, this work has 
several limitations. First, Rogers and colleagues did not experimentally manipulate 
conditionally related verses conditionally unrelated constituent events, only testing Fisk’s 
surprisingness account via post hoc analysis of individual scenarios. Second, the same 
authors compared believer verses non-believer differences following scale dichotomization, a 
Running Head: PARANORMAL BELIEF & CAUSAL CONJUNCTION ERRORS 
11 
technique which has received considerable criticism (MacCallum, Zhang, Preacher & 
Rucker, 2002). Finally, their study examined conjunctive biases in relation to global 
paranormal beliefs only. Evidence for the extent to which stronger believers (in different 
types of alleged paranormal phenomena) are prone to generating causal verses acausal CEs is 
currently lacking.  
Given Fisk’s surprise theory perspective - hence emphasis on the more surprising 
(subjectively less likely) constituent shaping conjunctive probability estimates (Fisk, 2002; 
Fisk & Pidgeon, 1998) - the present study also investigates the extent to which less likely  
relatedness type interactions predict CE generation. According to Fisk, when constituents are 
(perceived to be) positively conditionally related there is a potential for some observers to 
shift their focus away from the less likely event onto the conditional event - that is, from p(B) 
to p(B|A) - when judging conjunctive probabilities, thereby rendering CE generation more 
likely. Such a shift in focus would manifest as the LL constituent  relatedness term 
predicting more CEs. The current study tests this assertion.  
1.4 Paranormal Belief Types 
Finally, previous work suggests individuals who endorse extrasensory perception (ESP) 
and/or psychokinesis (PK) are more prone to probabilistic reasoning - including conjunctive - 
biases than those who believe in life after death (LAD), at least in part because LAD beliefs 
are shaped primarily by socio-cultural, philosophical and/or motivational factors not 
statistical sophistication (Rogers, 2014; Thalboure, 1996). Recently Rogers, Qualter and 
Wood (2016; Study 1) found PK believers judged a depicted coincidence experience more 
reflective of paranormal knowing than either ESP or LAD believers. Whilst follow-up work 
failed to replicate these trends (Rogers, Qualter & Wood, 2016; Study 2) subsequent research 
by Rogers, Fisk and Lowrie (2016) found conjunctive biases were more prevalent amongst 
ESP and to a slightly lesser extent PK believers than it was amongst LAD believers, with the 
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first two believer types making more CEs when background evidence (scenario content) was 
“inductively confirmed” by the second constituent5. With these data in mind, assessing the 
extent to which constituents’ conditional relatedness might impact on CE generation (and 
CPEs) across these three types of paranormal belief seems warranted.  
1.5 Study Aims and Hypotheses 
The present research examines the extent to which belief in three types of alleged 
paranormal phenomena - ESP, PK and LAD - predict conjunction error generation across two 
levels of conditional relationship (related verses unrelated) between constituent pairs. It also 
examines the role paranormal belief and constituent relatedness play within Fisk’s potential 
surprise account of the fallacy which, as stated earlier, emphasizes the relationship between 
component and conjunctive probability estimates. For linguistic convenience the two levels 
of conditional relatedness - currently “positively conditionally related” and “conditionally 
unrelated” - are hereafter abbreviated to “related” and “unrelated” respectively. Several 
hypotheses are advanced. 
First, stronger paranormal believers will generate more CEs than individuals with less 
pronounced paranormal belief (H01).  
Second, more CEs will be made for related over unrelated constituent events (H02).  
Third, if stronger paranormal believers are prone to making more causal CEs then a 
significant belief  relatedness interaction will result, with stronger believers making more CEs 
for related (over unrelated) constituents relative to weaker paranormal believers (H03).  
Fourth and from Fisk’s surprisingness perspective, a significant less likely  relatedness 
interaction will emerge such higher estimates of the subjectively less likely constituent - defined 
                                                 
5 Inductive confirmation occurs when the credibility of a hypothesis is heightened by previously acquired 
background evidence (Tentori, Crupi & Russo, 2013). 
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by which of p(A) or p(B\A) has the lower value - will predict more CEs albeit for related 
constituents only (H04).  
By extension, a significant three-way paranormal belief  less likely  relatedness interaction 
will also be found such that more CEs will be generated by stronger paranormal believers who 
provide higher estimates of the less likely constituent relative to weaker paranormal believers 
who do the same, albeit for related events only (H05).  
Finally, the hypothesized belief-based trends described above will be more pronounced for 
ESP and PK, relative to LAD, beliefs (H06). 
2. Method 
2.1 Participants 
One hundred and sixty members of the UK general public were sampled with 130 
completed questionnaires returned; a response rate of 81.3%. Respondents were aged 16 to 
72 years (M=34.4 years; SD=13.3 years) with most being female (57.3%), of Caucasian 
ethnicity (91.4%) and either employed (60.7%) else in full time higher education (18.8 %). 
Two-fifths were qualified to undergraduate degree level or higher (41.5%) with an eighth 
attaining the same level of qualification in math, statistics and/or psychology (12.4%). No 
other demographic details were taken6. 
2.2 Design and Analyses  
Hypotheses were tested via repeated measures Generalized Linear Mixed Model analyses, 
one per paranormal belief type. Linear Mixed Modeling (LMM) - also known as multilevel 
linear modeling (MLM) - is an extension of standard regression analysis which is more 
flexible in that it can incorporate factors that are hierarchically clustered or “nested” within 
others. LMM is also more flexible for several other reasons. For instance, it can differentiate 
                                                 
6 Respondents reporting ‘other’ levels of qualification either generally (n=10) and/or specifically in 
math/stats/psychology (n=3) are excluded from these figures. 
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between fixed verses random effects and can overcome problems associated with missing 
data, non-independent observations, non-homogeneous regression slopes, non-constant error 
variance and, for repeated measures designs, non-sphericity. Additionally, Generalized LMM 
analysis (GLMM) can be applied to non-normal (e.g., binary) outcomes where the 
relationship between predictors and the criterion measure is non-linear (Field, 2013; Norušis, 
2007; Twisk, 2006). Given these advantages, GLMM was deemed more robust and more 
suitable for current purposes.  
A total of three GLMMs were undertaken, in each case with eleven predictor variables 
simultaneously entered. These predictors were as follows: paranormal belief type (either 
ESP, PK or LAD beliefs), constituent relatedness type (related verses unrelated), the belief  
relatedness interaction terms, estimates of the subjectively less likely (LL) and for 
completeness the subjectively more likely (ML) constituents plus six two and three-way 
belief-based interaction terms as described in the results section below. Interaction terms 
were added to test whether paranormal belief effects were consistent across the two levels of 
constituent relatedness. All predictors were treated as fixed factors with respondents’ eight 
CE scores (one per scenario; the level 1 variable) treated as random factors as if clustered 
within each individual (the contextual variable). Each GLMM also included a random 
intercept term with any significant correlates found in preliminary analysis added to the 
model as potential covariates. Prior to analyses, all non-dichotomous predictors were 
subjected to grand mean centering so as to enhance the interpretability of findings (see Field, 
2013). In all cases, the presence (vs. absence) of a conjunction error served as the outcome 
measure with this assumed to be linearly related to predictors through a logit link function.  
Repeated measures covariance across scenarios was modeled via maximum likelihood 
(ML) estimation with models having either a scaled identity (specifying homogeneity of 
variance and zero covariances); a diagonal (specifying heterogeneity of variances), a first 
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order auto-regressive (AR1; specifying homogeneity of variance and systematically 
correlated covariances), or a compound symmetry (specifying homogeneity of variance and 
uniform non-zero covariances) covariance structure. Finally, models were examined initially 
with the intercept term - which broadly speaking accounts for all variance not captured by the 
entered predictors (Field, 2013) - assumed to be random. These analyses were duplicated 
except this time with the intercept term assumed to be fixed. Comparison of the random 
verses fixed intercept models would isolate any effect the former might have on the 
proportion of classification successes.  
2.3 Materials 
Questionnaire packs containing a brief, the scenario judgments, paranormal belief and 
demographics questionnaires (described below) plus a detachable debrief sheet were created. 
A second version of the pack - with reversed placement of the scenario judgments verses 
paranormal belief questionnaires - was created to counter potential order effects. 
2.3.1 Scenario Judgments Questionnaire (SJQ): The SJQ initially comprised sixteen 
hypothetical scenarios depicting a range of non-paranormal events (e.g., receiving an 
inheritance, winning a marrow competition) taken, else adapted, from those developed by 
Rogers et al. (2011). This number was reduced to eight following pilot testing (see below). 
Based on each scenario’s content or “background information (cf. Tentori et al., 2013), 
respondents were required to make three probability estimations; one for the first singular 
constituent [p(A)], one for the second [p(B)] and one for their co-occurrence; that is for the 
conjunctive term [p(A&B)]. All estimates were framed as “chances in 100” with, for clarity, 
a worked example provided in SJQ instructions.  
For current purposes, the first constituent was depicted as being either positively 
conditionally related else conditionally unrelated to the second. This experimental 
manipulation in constituent relatedness type (related verses unrelated) served as a two level 
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independent variable. The second constituent within each scenario remained the same across 
both versions. As such, the notion of conditional relatedness is operationalised as the degree 
to which the second constituent is deemed reliant upon or a consequence of the first. To 
illustrate consider Scenario 01 entitled “inheritance”. For the related version respondents had 
to estimate the chances in 100 that (a) Alan is told he was his uncle’s favorite living relative; 
that (b) Alan is told he will inherit his uncle’s entire £1 million estate; and finally that (c) 
Alan is told his uncle died of heart failure and Alan is told he will inherit his uncle’s entire £1 
million estate (italics added here). In the corresponding unrelated version, statement (a) is 
replaced by “Alan is told his uncle died at two o’clock in the afternoon” with statement (b) 
unchanged. Hence, in Scenario 01 conditional relatedness reflects the degree to which Alan 
inheriting his uncle’s entire estate is perceived as being reliant upon or a consequence of him 
being his uncle’s favorite (related version) as opposed to the fact that his uncle had died early 
one afternoon (unrelated version). Copies of the 16 scenarios plus associated constituent 
statements are available from the first author.  
Generally, lower probability estimates indicate respondents judge a given event 
subjectively less likely hence more surprising. Conjunction errors were made whenever the 
conjunctive term was rated more likely than either or both of the two singular constituent 
events (cf. Tversky & Kahneman, 1983).  
2.3.2 Belief in the Paranormal: This was assessed via the Australian Sheep-Goat Scale 
(ASGS; Thalbourne & Delin, 1993), a popular, psychometrically sound, 18-item measure of 
belief in three core paranormal concepts - namely extrasensory perception (ESP), 
psychokinesis (PK) and life after death (LAD) - across three subscales containing ten, five 
and three items respectively (Thalbourne, 2010). All ASGS items were rated along a 7-point 
Likert scale ranging from 1 'strongly disagree' to 7 'strongly agree' (cf. Rogers et al., 2011) 
with higher scores indicating stronger belief in each alleged paranormal phenomena. Given 
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criticisms of median split analysis (MacCallum et al., 2002) continuous belief measures were 
retained. 
2.3.3 Demographics: Respondents’ gender, age, ethnicity (16 categories), occupational status 
(12 categories) and levels of both general and mathematics/statistics/psychology-specific 
qualifications (from 1 ‘no qualifications’ to 5 ‘postgraduate/professional qualifications’) were 
assessed. 
2.4 Procedure 
Respondents for the main study were recruited opportunistically via medium sized 
businesses (e.g. corporate coffee shops, leisure centers) in various locations within North-
West England (e.g., Preston, Blackpool, Chorley). Having obtained appropriate permission 
from company management, members of the public were approached and asked if they would 
take part in a study of “beliefs about the likelihood of certain events happening". Volunteers 
were handed a randomly allocated questionnaire pack containing full instructions (including 
assurances of anonymity and confidentiality), the aforementioned SJQ, ASGS and 
demographic questionnaires with a detachable debrief (containing study and welfare agency 
details) also supplied. No payment or time limits were given. Completed questionnaires were 
returned to the researcher (PR or EL) in person else via the post. All aspects of the study 
conformed to the University’s School of Psychology as well as British Psychological Society 
(BPS) ethical guidelines. 
3. Results  
3.1 Manipulation Check 
Pilot testing was undertaken to assess the efficacy of experimental manipulations in 
constituent relatedness type, with volunteers (n=54; 55.4% female; aged 19-71 years; 
M=30.1; SD= 11.9; response rate 90.0%) recruited opportunistically from public areas (e.g. 
the library, refectory) of a large university in North-West England. As previously noted, 
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sixteen scenarios were taken from those originally developed by Rogers et al. (2011) with, for 
piloting purposes, each followed by two statements namely (a) one version of the first 
singular constituent (related or unrelated) plus (b) the second singular constituent 
(unchanging). For pilot testing, respondents were then asked “How likely is the second 
event?” plus “How likely is the second event given that the first event is true?” with ratings 
potentially ranging from 0 to 100. These two likelihood estimates - denoted p(B) and p(B\A) 
respectively - served as dependent measures. Detailed instructions including a worked 
example were provided. Following procedure adopted by Fisk and Pidgeon (1998), paired 
samples t-tests assessed the relationship between these two probability estimates. For 
experimental manipulations to be effective, p(B|A) minus p(B) differences needed to be 
larger for conditionally related constituent pairings but not for unrelated event pairings.  
Results of this pilot work are summarized in Table 2. As this shows t-tests for nine related 
event pairs reached significance (p’s≤.034; one-tailed), with associated effects sizes (Cohen’s 
d) ranging from -.59 to -1.39. In each of these nine cases, p(B|A) values were higher than 
p(B) values the implication being that experimental manipulations in constituent relatedness 
had, for these nine scenarios, been successful. Pilot H01 is supported 
*** Table 2 here *** 
Comparable p(B|A) minus p(B) differences did not emerge for unrelated event pairings in 
15 of the 16 scenarios examined (93.8%). The single noticeable exception was for Scenario 
09 (“horse”) where p(B|A) values were significantly higher than p(B) values. This difference 
renders Scenario 09 unsuitable for current purposes so it was dropped. In sum, eight of the 
original sixteen scenarios - numbers 01, 02, 04, 07, 11, 14, 15 and 16 - were deemed suitable 
for use in the main study. Related and unrelated versions of each were randomly allocated.  
3.2 Main Study: Preliminary Data Screening and Descriptives 
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In the main study seven respondents failed to provide the full complement of 24 
probability estimates (i.e. three for each of the eight scenarios). Because missing data is not a 
problem for GLMM so these individuals were retained. However, three underage (pre-16 
year old) respondents were dropped from the data set (final n=127; 1016 cases). 
3.2.1 Belief in the Paranormal: As Table 3 shows, all three paranormal belief subscales 
presented good internal reliability (’s ≥.79) with two - PK and LAD beliefs - presenting 
non-normality. Based on a significance cut off of p=.01 (Clark-Carter, 2004) PK beliefs were 
slightly skewed. No outliers were found for any ASGS measure and with no systematic 
biases evident all data were retained. Overall, levels of ESP, PK and LAD belief were 
comparable to those reported elsewhere (e.g., Rogers et al., 2016).  
*** Table 3 here *** 
3.2.2 Conjunction Errors: Table 4 presents mean constituent and conjunction probability 
estimates together with the percentage of responses resulting in a conjunction error (CE) for 
each of the eight retained scenarios. As Table 4 shows, some proportion of respondents made 
CEs for each scenario (range 28.3% to 53.3%; median=37.9; M=38.4; SD=8.4) rendering all 
suitable for inclusion in Study 2.  
Overall, a moderate number of CEs was generated with the distribution of total CEs 
having a slight but non-significant positive skew (see Table 5). In general, more CEs were 
made for related over unrelated constituent pairs, 2(1)=8.14; p=.004; two-tailed. A single CE 
outlier was found and subsequently removed.  
*** Tables 4 and 5 here *** 
3.3 Correlations 
As Table 6 displays, PK beliefs correlated with the number of CEs made in total as well as 
for unrelated constituent pairings. Unsurprisingly, the three paranormal belief types were 
highly inter-correlated. In terms of respondent demographics, ESP beliefs correlated 
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negatively with Caucasian (vs. non-Caucasian) ethnicity whilst LAD beliefs correlate 
negatively with both general and math/stats/psychology-specific qualifications. Noticeably, 
CE rates for conditionally related, unrelated and all constituent pairings were negatively 
associated with general qualifications - but not math/statistics/psychology-specific - 
qualification levels. Future analyses will control for this single demographic measure. No 
evidence of predictor multicollinearity was found (absolute r’s<.27). 
*** Table 6 here *** 
3.4 Predictors of Conjunction Error Generation 
Three GLMM analyses examined the extent to which paranormal belief type (either ESP, 
PK or LAD beliefs), constituent relatedness, general qualification levels, probability 
estimates for both the subjectively less likely (LL) and subjectively more likely (ML) 
constituent events plus relevant interaction terms predicted the presence (vs. absence) of 
conjunction errors for each of the eight retained scenarios. As also stated, all non-
dichotomous predictors were subjected to grand mean centering before a series of GLMMs - 
each assessing a different covariance structure - was performed. The final sample of 1016 
cases was deemed adequate for current purposes (cf. Fisk, 2017). 
In all analyses, compound symmetry (CS) structures failed to converge with first-order 
auto-regressive (AR1) structures generating the best fit for both fixed and random intercept 
models. For the most part, adding each additional predictor improved model fit to a 
significant degree, with inclusion of a random (verses fixed) intercept term doing the same. 
Summaries of these goodness-of-fit data are available on request from the first author. 
As Table 7 shows, the three models with a fixed intercept correctly classified 
approximately 18-23% of conjunction errors, around 89-90% of non-errors and roughly 62-
63% of all responses regardless of which paranormal belief type served as a predictor. 
Inclusion of the random intercept term improved classification accuracy for errors to around 
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40-42%, had minimal impact on accuracy for non-errors with all three remaining 
approximately 89%, and improved classification accuracy for all responses slightly to just 
over 70% in all models. Given the conceptual necessity of including a random intercept term 
in GLMM for repeated measures (Twisk, 2006), only random intercept models with an AR1 
covariance structure are discussed further.  
*** Table 7 here *** 
Table 8 presents inferential statistics for each of the three belief-based models. In each 
case the AR1 diagonal statistic - which represents the estimated residual variance in outcome 
scores across different level 1 variables (here, the eight scenarios) - was highly significant 
implying the likelihood of a CE being made (vs. not made) varied for each scenario. 
Similarly, the three AR1 rho statistics (aka. intraclass correlation coefficients) - which reflects 
the proportion of total variance in outcomes that is attributable to the same “contextual” 
variable (here, each respondent) - were all non-significant. This implication here is that 
unexamined factors within each class (respondent) had no impact on CE generation (Field, 
2013; Norušis, 2007).  
*** Table 8 here *** 
As Table 8 clearly shows, general qualifications were a highly significant negative 
predictor of CE generation in all three models. With all other predictors set at the respective 
means (“averaged”) a unit increase in general qualification level decreased the odds of 
making (verses not making) a CE by approximately a quarter [exp(b)’s from .74 to .77]. All 
demographic measures entered into current GLMM analyses served as potential covariates 
meaning associated hypotheses were not advanced. Subsequent findings should be treated as 
if general qualifications are controlled for. 
Table 8 also shows that of the three paranormal belief types, PK beliefs alone predicted 
the making (over non-making) of CEs to a statistically significant degree. More precisely, 
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with all other predictors set at the respective means (“averaged”) a unit increase in PK beliefs 
increased the odds of making (verses not making) a CE by approximately a quarter 
[exp(b)=1.26]. With parallel trends not emerging for belief in either ESP or LAD beliefs, H01 
is partially supported.  
Constituent relatedness type was also a positive predictor of CEs in all three models. Thus, 
presentation of related (vs. unrelated) constituent events increased the odds of CE generation 
by just over half [exp(b)’s from 1.56 to 1.63]. As such, H02 is fully supported.  
Contrary to expectations, no significant belief x relatedness type interactions emerged 
meaning that with all other measures averaged, stronger paranormal believers made as many 
CEs for related (vs. unrelated) constituents as did those with weaker paranormal beliefs. With 
this the case for all three belief types, H03 is completely unsupported.  
Estimates for the subjectively less likely (LL) constituent also predicted CE generation, 
again in all three belief-based models. However, while Fisk (2002; Fisk & Pidgeon, 1998) 
has demonstrated that the conjunctive probability is largely determined by the magnitude of 
the LL event (implying a positive relationship), currently findings suggest, paradoxically, that 
LL and conjunctive probability estimates are negatively related. Specifically, with all other 
predictor variables averaged, a unit increase in less likely estimations decreased the odds of a 
CE generation by around 1-2% [exp(b)’s from .98 to .99]. Because trends run counter to 
those anticipated, H04 is completely unsupported. As expected, estimates of the subjectively 
more likely (ML) constituent also failed to predict CEs.  
The lack of any significant three-way interactions involving subjectively less likely 
estimates means H05 is unsupported too. It seems, stronger paranormal believers who 
provided higher less likely estimations made just as many CEs for related verses unrelated 
constituent events as weaker believers who gave higher less likely estimations as well as 
Running Head: PARANORMAL BELIEF & CAUSAL CONJUNCTION ERRORS 
23 
stronger believers who gave lower less likely estimations. In sum, H05 too is completely 
unsupported. 
Finally, inspection of odds ratios across the three belief-based models confirmed PK 
beliefs [exp(b)=1.26] were more predictive of CE generation than ESP beliefs [exp(b)=1.13] 
which in turn, appeared slightly more predictive of CEs than LAD beliefs [exp(b)=1.08]. 
These odds ratios suggest PK beliefs are more strongly associated with CE generation than 
both ESP and LAD belief. Subsequent post hoc GLMM analysis with the three belief 
measures entered as predictors (and general qualification level again controlled for) was 
performed to verify these apparent differences. Results confirmed only PK beliefs predicted 
more CEs to a significant degree, b=.22; t=2.38; p=.018; exp(b)=1.25, [1.04, 1.51]. In 
contrast, ESP beliefs, b=-.07; t=-.53; p=.596; exp(b)=.93 [.73, 1.20] and LAD beliefs, b=.01; 
t=-.09; p=.930; exp(b)=1.01, [.83, 1.23] were both far from significant as predictors of CE 
generation. In sum, H06 is also supported.  
4. Discussion 
4.1. Predicting Conjunction Error Generation 
The present research produced a number of noteworthy findings. Subsequent discussion is 
for GLMM data with respondents’ general level of qualification controlled for. Consideration 
this demographic covariate is reserved for the “Additional Findings” section below. 
First, only one of the three paranormal belief types - PK beliefs - predicted CE generation 
to a significant degree, with stronger PK believers making more errors than individuals with 
less pronounced PK beliefs. This finding supports previous claims that a belief in (certain 
types of) paranormal phenomena is associated with a more pronounced conjunction fallacy 
(Brotherton & French, 2014; Rogers et al., 2009; 2011; 2016). However, present trends 
suggest it is only individuals who more strongly endorse the veracity of psychokinesis (mind-
over-matter) who are especially prone to the fallacy with, parallel conjunctive biases not 
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shared by those more strongly endorsing either ESP or LAD. Rogers, Fisk and Lowrie (2016) 
found stronger PK as well as stronger ESP believers were more error prone in this 
conjunctive context (see also Rogers Qualter & Wood, 2016) 
Second, as hypothesized, constituent relatedness predicted more CE generation with (all) 
respondents making more errors for (positively conditionally) related than they did for 
(conditionally) unrelated constituents. This finding supports previous claims that conjunction 
biases emerge whenever occurrence of the second constituent is perceived as being reliant on 
or causally related to occurrence of the first (Crisp & Feeney, 2009; Fabre et al., 1995; Fisk & 
Pidgeon, 1998; Locksley & Stangor, 1984) at least when an appropriate (within subjects) 
causal context is in place (Fabre et al., 1995). 
Third, but contrary to expectations, those with stronger paranormal beliefs made as many 
CEs for related (over unrelated) constituents as did individuals with less pronounced 
paranormal beliefs. This was the case regardless of whether respondents endorsed ESP, PK or 
LAD. The implication here is that stronger paranormal believers (all kinds) are just as 
sensitive to constituents’ conditional relatedness, and so just as (but no more) prone to 
making causal conjunction errors, as their skeptical counterparts. Furthermore, it seems PK 
believers’ heightened propensity for conjunctive biases is not shaped by their perception of 
the second constituent’s reliance or causal dependence upon the first (e.g., Crisp & Feeney, 
2009). Similar claims in relation to global paranormal believers have been made elsewhere 
(Rogers et al., 2011). 
Fourth, estimates for the subjectively less likely (LL) constituent event significantly 
predicted conjunctive biases. Contrary to hypotheses, higher LL ratings were linked to the 
making of fewer, not more, CEs. This result was evident in all three belief -based models. 
However, it should be noted that despite being significant, odds ratios were very close to 
unity with higher estimations of the subjectively less likely event leading to no more than a 
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2% reduction in CE generation. Such a small effect casts doubt over the robustness of current 
findings with again, replication needed. 
Lastly and again contrary to hypotheses, the three-way paranormal belief  relatedness  
less likely interactions failed to reach significance in all three belief-based models. The 
implication here is that event surprisingness had the same impact on CE generation regardless 
of both (a) the strength and/or type of respondents’ paranormal endorsement and/or (b) the 
nature of constituents’ conditional relationship (related verses unrelated). By extension, it 
appears those with stronger PK beliefs did not make more CEs because they viewed either (a) 
the second constituent alone (i.e. the singular event) or (b) the second constituent given prior 
occurrence of the first (i.e. the conditional event) as being less likely - or by definition, any 
more surprising- than individuals with weaker PK beliefs. Earlier claims to this effect are 
now extended beyond global paranormal beliefs (Rogers et al., 2011) to a more narrowly 
defined paranormal endorsement.  
4.2 Theoretical Implications 
Current findings suggest individuals with a stronger endorsement of one specific type of 
alleged paranormal phenomena, namely psychokinesis, are more susceptible to making 
conjunction errors - and thus to overestimating the likelihood of co-occurring relative to 
constituent events (Tversky & Kahneman, 1982; 1983) - than are those with less pronounced 
PK beliefs. Current findings are therefore consistent with most (Brotherton & French, 2014; 
Dagnall, Drinkwater et al., 2016; Prike et al., 2017; Rogers et al., 2009; 2011; 2016) but not 
all (Dagnall, Denovan et al., 2016; Dagnall et al., 2007; Dagnall et al., 2014) previous work 
on this topic.  
As already implied, the range and complexity of factors associated with adult 
paranormality (French & Stone, 2014l Irwin, 2009) means even strict normative reasoning 
will not prevent at least some paranormal belief formation occurring. Given this caveat, 
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present findings are consistent with the broader view that belief in (some types of) ostensibly 
paranormal phenomena - here, a specific endorsement of PK - is associated with more errors 
in probabilistic reasoning (Rogers, 2014; Rogers et al., 2016; Study 1; Wiseman & Watt, 
2006) and thus certain types of cognitive “deficit” (Irwin, 2009). This remains the case 
despite current evidence suggesting PK beliefs are unrelated to both general and 
math/statistics psychology-specific qualification levels. Whilst the former adds to generally 
mixed evidence for paranormal believers being less well-educated, the latter fails to support 
previous claims that paranormal endorsement is less prominent amongst those trained in a 
scientific discipline (see French & Stone, 2014; Irwin, 2009). 
With current scenarios all depicting a non-paranormal event, contextual cues implicating 
the possibility of PK (cf. Locksley & Stangor, 1984) were not immediately obvious. 
Nevertheless, it is possible stronger PK believers overlooked normative statistical rules and 
misattributed what was for them a plausible, presumably paranormal and perhaps even PK-
based mechanism to explain co-occurring events (Rogers, Qualter & Wood, 2016; Study 1; 
Wiseman & Watt, 2006). In the "pregnancy" case for instance, the sister's surprise visit may 
have been seen as the result of one twin’s direct mental influence over the other. Likewise, 
winning the “marrow” competition might have been deemed reasonable evidence for direct 
mental influence on livings systems (DMILS). Finally, in the sixteenth century “house” 
scenario, a sudden infestation of rats might have been viewed as one consequence of 
recurrent spontaneous psychokinesis or, as RSPK is more commonly known, poltergeist 
activity7. At this stage, such interpretations are merely conjecture. Also, it is difficult to see 
how parallel PK-based interpretations could be applied to the remaining six cases (i.e. 
inheritance, career, woman, sleep and murder) given their scenario content.  
                                                 
7 For discussion of both DMILS and RSPK see Irwin and Watt (2007). 
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A second possibility is that PK believers hold an arguably more extreme paranormal 
worldview (cf. Irwin & Watt, 2007) that for some, as yet undetermined, reason renders them 
more susceptible to conjunctive biases. Whilst rare events normally require several co-
occurring factors before a plausible explanation can be constructed (Locksley & Stangor, 
1984) for believers, particularly those holding a more extreme paranormal worldview, a 
single metaphysical concept such as psychokinesis will often suffice (Wiseman & Watt, 
2006). At least one other study has found coincidence misperceptions may be unique to PK 
over types of paranormal believer (Rogers, Qualter & Wood, 2016; Study 1). As these 
authors suggest, it is possible PK believers have a more extreme and noticeably “looser” 
mental representation of what constitutes a remarkable coincidence and thus a lower 
threshold for being surprised by co-occurrences relative to other types of paranormal believer 
not to mention paranormal skeptics (cf. Hadlaczky & Westerlund, 2011). If true, PK believers 
would require less subjective evidence of relatedness before they start to see meaningful 
patterns in essentially random stimuli (e.g., Brugger & Taylor, 2003), a process recently 
termed “patternicity” (Shermer, 2011; p.60). However, current evidence that PK believers 
remain unaffected by differing levels of constituent relatedness (related verses unrelated) 
weakens this argument. It should also be noted that follow-up work by Rogers et al. (2016; 
Study 2) failed to replicate their initial (Study 1) finding, leaving the uniqueness of PK 
believers’ lower threshold for being surprised by co-occurrences open to question.  
A related possibility is that PK believers failed to judge the second constituent less likely 
(more surprising) when this followed the first because such an outcome actually conformed 
to their paranormal worldview. If true, PK believers would not only remain unsurprised by 
occurrence of the second constituent they might, under the circumstances, have even come to 
expect it. Thus, what for most people would be an unlikely/unlikely (U/U) combination 
would, for PK believers, be an unlikely/likely (U/L) combination of constituent events. The 
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implication here is that PK believers misperceive positively conditionally related constituents 
as being negatively conditionally related, with the usual limits on CE generation for U/L 
combinations (cf. Fisk & Pidgeon, 1998) for some reason not applying. To illustrate, consider 
the same person winning both the UK National Lottery (“Lotto”) and the Euromillions lottery 
jackpots on the same day. With objective odds of 45 million-to-1 and 140 million-to-1 
respectively (Lottoland, 2016), co-occurrence of these two independent and highly unlikely 
lottery wins would, for most people, seem too remarkable-a-coincidence even to contemplate. 
But for those who believe in the veracity of money spells - hence of consciously directed PK 
(Greenwood & Airey, 2009) - such co-occurrences may be far from remarkable. Such a 
worldview might explain why more extreme PK believers present a stronger fallacy in 
general. Whilst the current lack of a PK belief  less likely interaction suggests this is not the 
case, previous evidence that stronger (ESP and) PK believers are prone to more CEs for 
confirmatory (over disconfirmatory) conjunctions than their skeptical counterparts (Rogers, 
Fisk & Lowrie, 2016) implies it is at least a possibility. Further work exploring the 
relationship between paranormal beliefs and negatively conditionally related constituent 
events seems worthwhile.  
A final option is that current trends for PK believers are a spurious artifact of multiple 
testing. As already noted, initial evidence that PK believers judged a seemingly remarkable 
coincidence (co-occurrence) more reflective of paranormal knowing (Rogers, Qualter & 
Wood, 2016; Study 1) was not replicated (Rogers, Qualter & Wood, 2016; Study 2) and it is 
possible similar non-replication might apply to current trends. With this in mind, further 
research is needed to verify the findings reported here.  
4.3 Additional Findings 
Correlations revealed a number of other noteworthy trends. First, and as one might expect, 
generally more qualified individuals made fewer CEs than those with less general education 
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attainment. In contrast, respondents’ level of qualification specifically in math, statistics 
and/or psychology was unrelated to CE rates. This was true regardless of whether 
constituents were depicted as being conditionally unrelated or positively conditionally 
related. These trends are consistent with previous evidence that level of statistical training 
and/or sophistication has little impact on fallacy generation (e.g., Msaouel, Kappos, Tasoulis, 
Apostolopoulos, Lekkas et al., 2014; Rogers et al., 2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 1982; 
although see e.g., Benassi & Knoth, 1993; Rogers et al., 2009)8.  
It is noticeable that many more respondents were educated to undergraduate level 
generally (38.9%) than specifically in math, statistics and/or psychology (11.3%); a ratio of 
almost 3-to-1. Frequencies for those attaining higher degrees is even more contrasting; a sixth 
of the sample attaining a postgraduate/professional qualification regardless of discipline 
(17.6%) compared only a very small minority - less than a twentieth - doing likewise in math, 
statistics and/or psychology (1.7%); a ratio in excess of 10-to-1. Whilst unsurprising, the 
preponderance of those with more years of formal, post-compulsory educational attainment 
regardless of discipline may explain why only general qualification levels were associated 
with lower CE generation. One possibility is that more qualified individuals had better 
linguistic understanding of task instructions and/or the semantics, namely the fact that one 
singular constituent does not automatically negate the other; in short, that p(A) was not 
equivalent to p(A & not B). In line with Fisk (2017) such interpretation seems unlikely. A 
second possibility is that generally better qualified individuals acquired some form of 
reasoning or critical thinking ability - perhaps improved verbatim matching/monitoring or 
better task mindfulness (cf. Liberali, Reyna, Furlan, Stein & Pardo, 2012) - that is more 
suited to judging conjunctive outcomes than statistical training alone. A third is that, by virtue 
                                                 
8 Despite psychology degrees dedicating far less time to statistical techniques and numerical problem solving 
than degrees in math and statistics, there appears to be little difference in the impact these three disciplines have 
on fallacy generation (Prike et al., 2017). 
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of their broader education and university experiences, those with higher general qualifications 
were, for some as yet unknown reason, less surprised by the subjectively less likely (LL) 
constituent event which, as noted earlier, is key to shaping conjunctive probabilities estimates 
and potential CE generation (Fisk, 2002; Fisk & Pidgeon, 1996). Subsequent testing in which 
all LL  qualification correlations were significant and of similar magnitude except for LL  
math/statistics/psychology-specific qualifications given related constituents (causal 
conjunctions) offers some support for this suggestion9. A final possibility is that current 
differences in the degree to which general verses math/statistics/psychology-specific 
qualification levels co-varied with fallacy generation (and/or LL estimations) was merely an 
artifact of the current experimental design. In this case, unambiguously attributing differences 
in CE rates to general educational attainment would not be possible. More work is needed to 
determine which, if any, of these possibilities holds true.  
Second, individuals with stronger ESP beliefs tended to be of non-Caucasian rather than 
Caucasian ethnicity whilst those with stronger LAD beliefs tended to be less well educated - 
both generally and specifically in terms of math, statistics and/or psychology. These findings 
are consistent with much, if not all, previous work on demographic correlates of adult 
paranormality with the latter supporting Otis and Alcock’s (1982) claim that afterlife 
endorsement is associated with lower educational attainment (for reviews see French & 
Stone, 2014; Irwin, 2009). 
4.4 Methodological issues and Ideas for Future Research 
The current study has several strengths including the use of community-based sampling 
with acceptable n, multiple vignettes, pilot testing to validate levels of constituent relatedness 
                                                 
9 For scenarios incorporating unrelated constituent events, LL ratings correlated with both general and 
math/statistics/ psychology-specific qualifications (r=-.13; p=.008; and r=-.14; p=.002 respectively). When 
scenarios contained positively conditionally related constituents, LL estimates correlated negatively with 
general but not with math/statistics/ psychology-specific qualifications (r=-.12; p=.013; and r=-.04; p=.437; ns 
respectively).  
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and employment of a well-established, psychometrically sound measure of paranormal belief. 
Additionally, (Generalized) Linear Mixed Modeling allowed assumptions about missing data, 
the homogeneity of regression slops and the independence of residuals to be relaxed. Finally, 
by incorporating a repeated measures component respondents were given the appropriate 
"causal context" for predictors of CE generation to be examined (cf. Fabre et al., 1985). 
Despite this methodological rigor a number of limitations are worthy of mention. 
First, comparison of conditionally related verses conditionally unrelated statement pairs at 
the pilot stage was assessed using unadjusted alpha values of .05. Possible occurrence of 
Type 1 errors may have meant some of the statement pairs classified as being “conditionally 
related” may not have been so. Conversely, potential occurrence of Type 2 errors may have 
meant some statement pairs labeled “conditionally unrelated” may, in fact, have been related. 
However, this would also have increased the likelihood of Type 2 errors emerging in the 
main study, rendering it more difficult to identify significant relatedness type effects on CE 
generation. Since significant relatedness type effects were found in the main study, Type 2 
errors can be excluded (although the effect of relatedness may still be stronger than our 
results suggest). Moreover, with full Bonferroni correction shown to increase the likelihood 
of Type 2 errors at the level of individual comparisons (e.g., Narum, 2006) such adjustment 
was deemed unsuitable for current IV manipulation checks. 
Second, scenarios were clearly non-paranormal in content meaning opportunities to 
misattribute paranormal relatedness, and thus make paranormally-driven causal CEs, may 
have been limited. Whilst previous evidence suggests believers are unaffected by the depicted 
paranormality of scenarios (Rogers et al., 2007; Rogers et al., 2011) further research should 
consider contrasting paranormal verses non-paranormal event types and/or employing a wider 
variety of conjunctive scenarios. 
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Third, despite scenarios depicting an unlikely/unlikely constituent combination it is 
possible some respondents perceived the second event to be even less likely (even more 
surprising) once the first unlikely event had already occurred. In other words, respondents 
may have misperceived unlikely/unlikely (U/U) combinations as having a negative 
conditional relationship even for scenarios where no conditional relationship existed. Under 
these circumstances, estimates of the conjunctive term can sometimes anchor on to the 
associated conditional term [p(B\A)] which may, in turn, be rated subjectively less likely 
(more surprising) than both singular events [p(A) and p(B)]. With this in mind, and assuming 
probability estimates are randomly distributed around this anchor, most of the sample will fail 
to generate a conjunction error (Fisk & Pidgeon, 1996). This might be especially relevant to 
individuals holding stronger paranormal (especially PK) beliefs. Future studies should test 
this possibility. 
Fourth, the extent to which believers' susceptibility to conjunctive biases is shaped by the 
strength - rather than mere existence - of constituent relatedness remains unexplored. Given 
Crisp and Feeney’s (2009) finding that more CEs are generated for strongly causal over 
weakly causal and, in turn, for weakly causal over acausal constituent pairs, research 
exploring stronger (PK) believers’ CE generation across varying levels of conditional 
relatedness seems worthwhile. 
Given recent claims by Dagnall, Denovan et al., (2016), future studies should also assess 
believers’ proneness to conjunctive biases once more general randomness misperceptions are 
controlled for. Similarly, with conjunctive errors indicative of heuristical processing (Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1983) and paranormal believers having a stronger preference for experiential 
over rational thinking styles (e.g. Aarnio, & Lindeman, 2005; Irwin & Wilson, 2013), future 
work should also examine the extent to which (PK) believers’ proneness to CEs are 
influenced by their thinking style predilections. 
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More broadly, the relatively low proportion of non-Caucasian respondents sampled (8.6%) 
means the current study has less-than-perfect generalisability. This could be important given 
the influence ethnicity seems to have on at least some paranormal belief types (for reviews 
and critiques see French & Stone, 2014; Irwin, 2009).  
Finally, judgments may have been influenced by the order of scenarios within the SJQ (cf. 
Prike et al., 2017; Study 2). Additional counterbalancing should therefore be considered. 
4.5 Conclusion 
The present study builds upon previous work to advance understanding of the relationship 
between stronger paranormal beliefs and CE generation. In particular, it sought to establish 
whether believers were more biased in their judgments of positively conditionally related 
over conditionally unrelated constituent events. No support for this hypothesis was found. 
Whilst stronger PK believers seem especially susceptible to making conjunction errors 
generally, this appears to be for reasons others than their greater sensitivity to the perceived 
conditional relatedness (causal dependence) of co-occurring events. More work is needed to 
replicate current evidence and, if confirmed, to establish the precise psychological processes 
underlying paranormal (PK) believers' proneness to the conjunction fallacy. 
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Table 1: Summary of Three Conjunction Fallacy Accounts† 
 
Account 
 
Focus on constituents’ 
Constituent  
Relatedness 
 
Key Determinant(s) of Conjunction Error Generation 
 
Applicable to which combinations 
     
M A representativeness -- more likely of first vs. second constituent [p(A) or p(B)] common although mostly L/U 
     
A B conditional relatedness unrelated as for M A paradigm as for M A paradigm 
  positive presence / strength of constituent relatedness common for L/U, L/U, UL and U/U  
  negative conjunction errors rare -- 
     
PSV surprisingness unrelated  less likely of first vs. second constituent [p(A) vs. p(B)] L/U, L/U, UL and U/U   
  positive less likely of second constituent vs. second constituent given first [p(B) vs. p(B\A)] L/U, L/U, UL and U/U  
  negative conjunctive probability estimates too low for CE generation -- 
     
†M A and A B accounts from Tversky and Kahneman (1983); Potential Surprise Value (PSV) account from Fisk (2002; Fisk & Pidgeon, 1998); likely/likely (L/L), likely/unlikely (L/U), unlikely/likely (U/L) and 
unlikely/ unlikely (U/U) constituent combinations 
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Table 2: Probability estimates for each scenario by constituent relatedness type† 
 Statement  Conditionally Unrelated  Positively Conditionally Unrelated  
Scenario Type   M (SD) t df p  d  M (SD) t df p  d  
                    
01. inherit  (b) alone  30.0 (25.2) .53 16 .301  .17  30.1 (28.8) -2.81 17 .006 ** -1.04  
  (b) given (a)  25.6 (24.5)        50.6 (27.8)          
                    
02. career  (b) alone  37.3 (16.7) -.80 17 .217   -.18  35.6 (18.4) -3.50 16 .015 * -1.36  
  (b) given (a)  40.8 (22.1)        53.5 (18.7)          
                        
03. football (b) alone  33.1 (26.6) -.46 17 .327  -.11  48.8 (30.7) -.57 16 .288  -.21  
  (b) given (a)  36.0 (24.9)        54.4 (23.0)          
                    
04. house  (b) alone  52.6 (28.1) .11 16 .457   .03  35.8 (27.2) -2.34 17 .016 * -.67  
  (b) given (a)  51.8 (24.0)        52.8 (23.7)          
                        
05. motorway (b) alone  41.1 (26.8) .40 17 .347  .11  31.4 (27.5) -.89 17 .194  -.17  
  (b) given (a)  38.3 (24.0)        36.1 (28.4)          
                    
06. gliding (b) alone  61.1 (21.8) 1.60 17 .065   .51  63.8 (24.8) .09 16 .931  .03  
  (b) given (a)  48.6 (27.2)        63.2 (17.3)          
                        
07. woman  (b) alone  40.2 (22.8) -1.14 16 .130  -.33  37.7 (21.8) -1.95 17 .034 * -.75  
  (b) given (a)  48.0 (24.5)        51.1 (22.5)          
                    
08. watch (b) alone  53.9 (28.7) .18 17 .429   .06  65.8 (20.1) -1.48 17 .079  -.42  
  (b) given (a)  52.2 (31.4)         74.4 (20.7)          
                    
† Significant at the * p<.05 ** p<.01 levels (one-tailed; n=54). Scenarios marked with a tick ()retained 
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Table 2: Probability estimates for each scenario by constituent relatedness type (continued)† 
 Statement  Conditionally Unrelated  Positively Conditionally Unrelated  
Scenario Type   M (SD) t df p  d  M (SD) t df p  d  
                    
09. horse  (b) alone  35.6 (30.2) 1.77 17 .048 * .32  31.5 (18.5) -1.72 16 .024 * -.59  
  (b) given (a)  27.2 (21.8)           44.1 (23.9)            
                    
10. husband (b) alone  43.4 (28.9) 1.03 16 .159  .32  38.9 (34.5) -.02 17 .493   -.01  
  (b) given (a)  34.8 (23.6)           39.1 (29.6)            
                                 
11. sleep   (b) alone  25.8 (22.4) .28 17 .391  .09  33.9 (32.1) -2.13 17 .024 * -.48  
  (b) given (a)  23.7 (23.8)           48.2 (27.4)            
                    
12. mill (b) alone  30.8 (26.6) 1.04 17 .156  .26  50.3 (19.3) 1.17 15 .130   .41  
  (b) given (a)  24.4 (21.6)           43.4 (13.9)            
                                 
13. stomach (b) alone  47.5 (18.4) -.30 15 .384  -.05  43.6 (34.2) .08 17 .469  .02  
  (b) given (a)  48.4 (20.5)           42.8 (30.8)            
                    
14. murder   (b) alone  37.4 (22.2) .30 17 .384  .06  47.5 (18.5) -3.24 15 .003 ** -1.39  
  (b) given (a)  35.9 (25.4)           64.7 (17.5)            
                                 
15. marrow  (b) alone  43.6 (20.7) 1.51 17 .076  .34  57.4 (22.4) -2.98 17 .004 ** -.85  
  (b) given (a)  36.9 (18.1)           69.2 (19.6)            
                    
16. pregnant  (b) alone  34.4 (21.4) -1.65 15 .059  -.52  27.6 (28.4) -3.98 16 <.001  ** -1.22  
  (b) given (a)  47.2 (27.4)          52.4 (28.7)            
                    
† Significant at the * p<.05 ** p<.01 levels (one-tailed; n=54). Scenarios marked with a tick ()retained 
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Table 3: Internal Reliability, Descriptive, Normality & Skew Statistics for Paranormal Belief Subscales† 
Belief Reliability  Descriptives  Normality  Skew  
Type   M (SD) Obs Range Median  K-S      (df) p   IS   (SE) Z    
                   
ESP .92  3.65 (1.49) 1.00-6.10 3.80  .08 (129) .055 a  -.23 (  .22) -1.03     
PK .89  2.68 (1.48) 1.00-6.25 2.25  .14 (129) <.001 ***  .47 (  .22) 2.10 *   
LAD .79  3.76 (1.74) 1.00-7.00 4.00  .10 (129) .003 **  -.14 (  .22) -.61     
                   
† Reliability given by Cronbach’s alpha () coefficient; potential ranges 1:00 to 7:00; normality indicated by Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) tests; sig. effects at the *p<.05 **p<.01 and *** p<.001 levels; a=approaches 
significance (two-tailed; n=121). 
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Table 4: Mean Probability Estimates & Percentage of Conjunction Errors by 
Constituent Relatedness Type & Scenario† 
Scenario Relatedness  First Constituent  Second Constituent  Conjunction  CEs 
 Type  M SD  M SD  M SD  % 
              
1. Inheritance Unrelated  38.39 (30.18)   24.43 (21.74)   18.63 (22.60)   26.8 
  Related  33.09 (25.88)  30.38 (24.39)  28.28 (28.77)  31.3 
  All  35.57 (27.98)   27.60 (23.28)   23.78 (26.41)   29.2 
              
2. Career Unrelated  65.27 (30.80)   31.00 (23.53)   26.75 (24.53)   21.9 
  Related  39.70 (23.77)  28.21 (20.78)  24.02 (21.24)  35.7 
  All  53.33 (30.45)   29.70 (22.24)   25.48 (23.00)   28.3 
              
3. House Unrelated  55.66 (33.33)   28.96 (25.90)   25.05 (23.86)   35.7 
  Related  45.42 (26.43)  34.39 (26.37)  29.66 (28.44)  32.8 
  All  50.20 (30.16)   31.86 (26.19)   27.51 (26.40)   34.2 
              
4. Woman Unrelated  16.75 (24.10)   26.68 (25.51)   21.93 (25.17)   55.4 
  Related  58.00 (23.41)  37.77 (27.63)  43.38 (30.91)  51.6 
  All  38.75 (31.39)   32.59 (27.12)   33.37 (30.23)   53.3 
              
5. Sleep Unrelated  18.09 (23.11)   34.48 (33.08)   14.72 (19.29)   26.6 
  Related  53.13 (30.75)  40.91 (28.27)  44.09 (32.90)  51.8 
  All  34.44 (32.06)   37.48 (30.97)   28.43 (30.23)   38.3 
              
6. Murder Unrelated  27.36 (23.41)   31.59 (25.51)   25.19 (25.78)   32.8 
  Related  55.88 (28.12)  31.07 (27.02)  40.61 (32.45)  50.0 
  All  40.67 (29.32)   31.35 (26.11)   32.38 (29.97)   40.8 
              
7. Marrow Unrelated  45.97 (31.60)   41.19 (27.74)   35.20 (28.51)   39.1 
  Related  35.38 (22.55)  35.34 (24.46)  35.50 (28.76)  53.6 
  All  41.03 (28.14)   38.46 (26.31)   35.34 (28.51)   45.8 
              
8. Pregnant Unrelated  40.52 (32.37)   30.93 (27.39)   27.52 (27.48)   35.7 
  Related  29.20 (29.42)  27.31 (26.16)  22.27 (26.66)  39.1 
  All  34.48 (31.22)   29.00 (26.69)   24.72 (27.06)   37.5 
              
-- Mean Unrelated  38.55 (32.91)  31.39 (26.81)  24.45 (25.31)  34.0 
  Related  43.45 (28.14)  32.99 (25.80)  33.16 (29.74)  42.9 
  All  41.00 (30.70)  32.18 (26.31)  28.80 (27.94)  38.4 
              
† For conditionally unrelated events, probability estimates for the first constituent are denoted by p(A), for the second constituent by p(B) 
and for the conjunctive term by p(A&B). For positively conditionally related events estimates for the first constituent are denoted by p(A), 
for the second constituent by p(B\A) and for the conjunctive term by p(A&B\A); potential ranges 0-100 (n=120). 
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Table 5: Descriptive, Normality & Skew Statistics for Mean Number of Conjunction Errors by Relatedness Type† 
Relatedness  Descriptives  Normality  Skew  
Type  M (SD) Obs Range Median  K-S   (df) p   IS (SE) Z    
                  
Related  1.72 (1.23) 1.00-4.00 2.00  .21 (120) <.001 ***  .37 .22 1.64     
Unrelated  1.36 (1.24) 1.00-4.00 1.00  .22 (120) <.001 ***  .63 .22 2.82 **   
All  3.08 (1.92) 1.00-8.00 3.00  .12 (120) <.001 ***  .24 .22 1.05     
                  
†Potential range for positively conditionally related & conditionally unrelated types 0-4; potential range for all 0-8; normality given by Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) tests; sig. effects at the 
*p<.05 **p<.01 and *** p<.001 levels; a=approaches significance (two-tailed; n=121). 
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Table 6: Correlations (r) between Paranormal Belief Types, Respondent Demographics & Mean Number of Conjunction Errors† 
 ESP 
 beliefs 
PK 
beliefs 
LAD 
beliefs 
 
Gender 
 
Age 
 
Ethnicity 
 
Occup 
Quals 
(general) 
Quals 
(m/s/p) 
CEs 
(related) 
CEs 
(unrelated) 
CEs 
(all) 
                         
ESP beliefs                                                 
PK beliefs .70 ***                                             
LAD beliefs .79 *** .62 ***                                         
Gender† .10   .15   .14                                       
Age -.16   -.13   -.07   -.14                                   
Ethnicity† -.22 * -.09   -.15   .05   .10                             
Occupation† .00   .02   .07   .19 * -.51 *** .07                       
Quals (general) -.09   .01   -.27 ** -.09   .00   .04   -.03                       
Quals (m/s/p) -.13   -.06   -.25 ** -.14   -.09   -.22 * -.01   .57 ***                 
CEs (related) .14   .19 * .14   -.06   -.01   -.03   -.02   -.25 ** -.17            
CEs (unrelated) .09   .15   .14   .15   -.09   -.12   .11   -.24 * -.08   .21 *      
CEs (all) .15   .22 * .18   .06   -.07   -.09   .06   -.32 ** -.17   .78 *** .77 ***    
                         
†Mean CEs for positively conditionally related, conditionally unrelated and all constituent pairs respectively. Dichotomous measures where higher scores reflect female gender, Caucasian ethnicity and student 
occupational status; m/s/p refers to math/statistics/psychology qualifications. Coefficients for one dichotomous measure reflect rb; coefficients for two dichotomous measures reflect phi; sig. effects at the *p<.05 
**p<.01 and *** p<.001 levels (two-tailed; n=108-120) 
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Table 7: Percentage of Conjunction Errors, Non-Errors & Responses Correctly 
Predicted by Paranormal Belief & Intercept Types† 
Response Intercept  ESP  PK  LAD  
Type Type  (%)  (%)  (%)  
  
 
 
   
 
 
Errors Fixed  20.0  23.1  18.5  
 
Random  41.2  39.7  42.2  
  
 
 
   
 
 
Non-errors Fixed  90.3  88.3  87.9  
 
Random  88.7  88.8  87.7  
  
 
 
   
 
 
All Fixed  63.8  63.7  61.8  
 
Random  70.8  70.3  70.6  
 
 
 
   
 
 
†Random intercept full models with first order auto-regressive (AR1) covariance structure ; figures to 1 decimal place; n=863 cases 
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Table 8: Predictors of Conjunction Error Generation (Yes vs. No) by Paranormal Belief Type† 
 
ESP  PK  LAD  
 
   
  
95% CI    
   
95% CI   
    
95% CI  
Predictor b t p 
 
exp(b) Lwr Upr  b t p 
 
exp(b) Lwr Upr  b t p 
 
exp(b) Lwr Upr  
 
   
    
   
    
   
    
   
Random Intercept -.83 -6.27 <.001 *** .43 .33 .56   -.84 -6.41 <.001 *** .43 .34 .56   -.80 -6.13 <.001 *** .45 .35 .58  
Belief .13 1.40 .161 
 
1.13 .95 1.36  .23 2.67 .008 ** 1.26 1.06 1.49  .08 .99 .325 
 
1.08 .93 1.25  
Relatedness  .49 3.25 .001 ** 1.63 1.21 2.18   .48 3.23 .001 ** 1.61 1.21 2.15   .44 3.04 .002 ** 1.56 1.17 2.07  
Belief x Related -.01 -.09 .931 
 
.99 .81 1.21  -.06 -.56 .573 
 
.95 .78 1.15  .01 .16 .870 
 
1.01 .86 1.19  
More Likely (ML) .00 .69 .490   1.00 1.00 1.01   .00 .71 .477   1.00 1.00 1.01   .00 .62 .534   1.00 1.00 1.01  
Less Likely (LL) -.02 -2.27 .024 * .99 .97 1.00  -.02 -2.39 .017 * .98 .97 1.00  -.01 -2.04 .042 * .99 .98 1.00  
Belief x ML  .00 .91 .365   1.00 1.00 1.01   -.00 -.70 .486   1.00 .99 1.00   .00 .57 .572   1.00 1.00 1.01  
Belief x LL  .00 .01 .993 
 
1.00 .99 1.01  .00 .68 .496 
 
1.00 1.00 1.01  -.01 -1.28 .201 
 
1.00 .99 1.00  
ML x Relatedness .01 1.25 .212   1.01 1.00 1.02   .01 1.07 .284   1.01 1.00 1.02   .01 1.06 .291   1.01 .99 1.02  
LL x Relatedness .01 1.19 .236 
 
1.01 .99 1.03  .01 1.48 .140 
 
1.01 1.00 1.03  .01 1.27 .203 
 
1.01 .99 1.03  
Belief x ML x Relate .00 .32 .749   1.00 .99 1.01   .01 1.52 .129   1.01 1.00 1.01   -.00 -.78 .436   1.00 .99 1.00  
Belief x LL x Relate -.00 -.24 .809 
 
1.00 .99 1.01  -.00 -.77 .441 
 
1.00 1.00 1.01  .01 1.06 .289 
 
1.01 1.00 1.01  
Gen. Qualifications -.31 -3.64 <.001 *** .74 .63 .87   -.32 -3.89 <.001 *** .73 .62 .85   -.27 -3.07 .002 ** .77 .65 .91  
 
   
    
   
    
   
    
   
AR1 Diagonal‡ .91 18.49 <.001 *** -- .82 1.01   .91 18.46 <.001 *** -- .82 1.01   .91 18.46 <.001 *** -- .82 1.01  
AR1 Rho‡ .04 .96 .337 
 
-- -.04 .13  .05 1.06 .288 
 
-- -.04 .13  .05 1.04 .297 
 
-- -.04 .13  
 
   
    
   
    
   
   
    
†All non-dichotomous predictors grand mean centered; full models with first order auto-regressive (AR1) covariance structure; odds rations given by exp(b) coefficients; figures to 2 decimal places; sig. effects at the 
*p<.05 **p<.01 and ***p<.001 levels (two-tailed; n=863 cases); inferential statistic for AR1 Rho (intraclass correlation coefficient) and AR1 Diagonal (estimated variance) is Z rather than t. 
 
 
 
 
